Halfway through a frustrating night -during which I slept little due to the massive disappointment of SA dropping out of the 2011 RWC- I started to see some reasons why the Springboks lost.

The thing that kept me awake most was the fact that the Springboks had 76% of the ball, dominated scrums and line-outs (Matfield taking 6 of their line-out balls), had territorial advantage for most of the match and had the Wallabies under massive pressure for almost the entire match and still lost the game.

Here are the 13 reasons I came up during my night of suffering.  

• Taking on the best in the world with a bunch of inexperienced coaches 

How is it possible -I kept asking myself during the night-  that the Springboks lost with all the experience in the side and all that possession? The reasons/answers I came up with are all imbedded in the extreme arrogance and stupidity of SARU management who thought they could take on the best in the world with an inexperienced (if not sub-standard) coach.

• Rule interpretation changes in 2009 

It is interesting to note that both teams who played in the 2007 final didn’t make it past the quarters this year. South Africa and England are probably the two Test Nations that are most imbedded into the 10-man-flyhalf-dictating-type playing style.

Both were unable to adjust after the 2009 rule interpretation chances. England went for youth and South Africa stuck with experience. England enforced the chances (in playing style) more aggressively while South Africa tried to take the middle road. In the end South Africa got caught between the two styles, relying (falling back) on one style too much when the going got tough and not doing enough of the other.

Looking at England, I don’t believe the selection of younger players would have changed our situation (in fact it would have made it worse like we saw in the Tri-Nations this year). I will however get back to the point of player selection later as it is one of the reasons I believe why the Springboks got unstuck.

• Payback for 4 years of not running with the ball

The Springboks were caught in between the two styles like I mentioned in the previous point and kept falling back on senior players who reverted to type when playing quality opposition.

During Jake White’s tenure the Springboks developed a style of scoring early in the match to take the lead and then reverted into defensive mode (which I hated with a passion), forcing the opponents to run at them so they could spring counter attacks off mistakes. They utilized the high kick and charge tactic to keep the pressure on the opposing team and squeezed the high kick receivers into the touch line with the fast Habana and Pierre Spies working in combo.

Things went haywire the moment the Springboks leaked the early Wallabies try and you could see the Springboks were totally stunned after being down 5-0 and then 8-0. They had to change their mindsets from being in the lead forcing the opponents to make play, towards chasing a lead.

In the end 4 years of not running enough with the ball required payback and they were just too one-dimensional on attack. There was’nt enough starter moves and not enough variety and the ball control at the ruck was just developed enough to run with the ball.

• No innovation 

The Springboks never moved beyond the pods and the pods changed over time into stagnant tombstones.

Over the last four years there was no development in the backline and no development of new starter moves/game plans around new talent.

Lack of innovation is the thing that links all the others together, as it is a key component in successful rugby at the highest level.

If you are standing still, you are predictable. If you are predictable you are vulnerable in 2 ways. Opponents can eventually match or surpass your temporary level of efficiency, or worse – render your tactics and / or methods obsolete by their own innovations.

The Springbok game plan is essentially sound, and has been hammered out over decades, so it is part of the “database” from which your players and coaches operate. And at its best it is not just power-forward packs, kicking fly halves, and aggressive defense. But it must be supplemented and updated.  The Springboks are 95% there, the 5% required is their breakdown structure and backline play starter moves, done with speed and precision. Once the Springbokse get that right they’ll be the force of yesteryear again.

• Lack of leadership 

There was no real leadership in the coaching group with the result that players ran the show. The senior players stuck with what they felt comfortable with and with what they knew.

This resulted into a stagnant environment where nothing new was carefully planned, practiced and implemented.

• Strategically ignorant 

It was four years of reactive coaching. No pro-active stuff. The All Blacks in 2009 saw opportunity in the new rule interpretations and stared to systematically plan and prepare for Tri-Nations 2010.

They (the All Blacks) were pro-active whilst the Springboks kept on trying to catch-up after each humiliating defeat with reactive measures.

The Springbok game plan was essentially to score early in the match and then hang on instead of developing the team to full potential.

The team and coaches were not trying to develop the Springbok game but focussed on the scoreboard. This is of course a Blue Bull thing (Naas Botha – look at the scoreboard) and enforced and maintained into the Springbok environment because of the lack of real presence and depth in the coaching group.

• Lack of attention to detail 

The stagnant pods, the spilling of the ball in contact, the giving away of possession at the ruck, the constant struggling in the scrums (yes it got better in this RWC but has been a persistent problem through-out the past 4 years), the poor quality of Springbok backline play, all resulted from a lack of attention to detail.

The Springboks lost this match against Australia due to running poor supporting lines. At the pods and when a player runs with the ball, Springbok supporting runners were far too close and too lateral, with the result that they had to turn to re-enter the collisions. It also put them in an unfafourable position to receive off-loads.

The Australian try came from two instances where the supporting runners were too lateral. The Springboks were on attack in their 22 and looking good, next moment an off-load is spilled because the supporting runner is too flat. Australia gets the ball, takes the Springboks into their 22, where the Springboks try and ruck it up. Again Brussow is too lateral in his support of Schalk Burger, he trips and falls down, creating a hole for the Australians to compete for the ball.

This is just an example of the lack of attention to detail which cost this Springbok team a number of Test matches over the last 4 years.

• Sub-standard rucking skills 

Closely related to points 3 and 7. Springbok rucking skills are way behind the ball game. It has developed since South Africans started playing Super 12 / 14 rugby but at Springbok level there has never been a concentrated effort to get it on par with the All Blacks.

The ruck or the collision area is the heart of All Black rugby. Warren Gatland is on his way to the final with a young and in my mind pretty mediocre bunch of players, due to rectifying this one facet of Welsh rugby.

How many times has a ‘fetcher’ flanker been the man of the match in Test matches against South Africa?. Just in this Rugby World Cup alone, Sam Warburton detroyed the Springboks at the rucks and was man of the match and so was Poccock yesterday in the quarter final match. Why is this? Why this pattern that ‘fetcher’ flankers are so influential when they play against the Springboks? Richie McCaw always has better games against the Springboks than against Australia, England, Wales or Ireland.

I would venture that these ‘fetcher’ flankers has such rippers against South Africa simply because the Springboks are so poor at the breakdowns. There is simply not enough attention to detail and not enough structure at the tackle area.

The Springboks know this and that’s why they try and limit or avoid running with the ball. Well, the problem is not going to disappear by ignoring it. Opposition teams target this area with the new rule interpretations because that’s how you can take opposition out of the match.

• Poor player management 

There was no national strategy to manage players. Peter de Villiers did not have enough stature or influence as National coach to enforce (or get Super Rugby coaches to buy into) a National strategy. Senior players played way too much rugby over the last two years.

• Over-reliance on senior players 

Peter de Villiers’ wheels came off every time he tried to play with younger players. He kept messing around with combinations (this was better during this RWC) but his lack of standing made him over-dependent on John Smit to steer the ship as well as on senior players to pull the wagon through the rough spots.

This culminated in senior players calling the shots. Player-driven teams can sometimes innovate but it is very hard for them to have both the “big picture” objectivity, as well as the selflessness to de-select themselves if necessary. The 1937 Springbok team was a player driven team and Doc Craven was because of that very much in favour of such a system. Morné du Plessis essentially coached the Springboks in 1976.

The new rule interpretations, which saw the game change in 2009 required somebody from outside the team to analyse and digest.

Players just don’t have the time to do the digestion and planning due to the amount of time they need to train.

The All Black innovation after the 2009 rule alterations was a collective effort, involving players but Henry and co initiated it and steered the process.

That is the balance. Coaches don’t have to be dictators. They can quietly co-ordinate the efforts and thoughts of players. Just as long as the coach gets his way on the things that count, but not in such a way that player input, initiative and thinking is stifled. It is a real tight-rope to walk, and an art in reading human nature, rather than a hard science.

Also, yes… it is very hard in the modern age to have player-coaches compared to the situation in the past. The reason is that as a result of video analysis, and professional staff, the innovative process has been shrunk down to micro-issues, but has also been sped up considerably.

You probably won’t get major and radical innovations like the ones which transformed the game historically, for example the 2-3-2, and then 3-4-1 scrum formation, Bennie Osler and tactical kicking, Hennie Muller and aggressive defence, Vic Cavanagh and rucking. Those are big rocks in place that transformed the very nature of rugby, and influenced successive generations.

Now, you need to change little things, and you need to do it constantly. What you did last year, or even last week may be out of date due to the brains, analysis, and support staff your opponents have at their disposal. Its just too much for a player to be on top of, and then also play well.

• Injuries to key players 

Frans Steyn could have slotted those two long range penalties and won the Springboks the match.

The over-reliance and over-playing of senior players resulted in injuries to other key players as well, notably Bakkies Botha and Juan Smith. Victor Matfield had to sit out for a couple of games and Heinrich Brussow actually went onto the field heavily strapped around the rib cage in yesterday’s match.

Fourie du Preez was just a shadow of his former glory after shoulder surgery, which kept him out of the game for a year.

All teams have injuries and there is the constant need to adjust to it. In South Africa’s case the injuries resulted from player fatigue due to poor player management, I believe.

•  Lack of speed 

All the above culminated into lack of speed on the park. Lack of speed in general play and lack of players with real line-breaking ability.

We were stuck with Bryan Habana, who was past his best due to a team set-up / environment which was not condusive to developing and using new talent.

There was also a clear lack of speed taking the ball up and recycling it. Too slow was a repeated utterance from me when the Bokke started any movement and when they were recycling the ball.

On the rare occasions that the Springboks were able to force the opponents on the back foot, they almost always scored. The Springboks lacked consistency in this department due to lack of attention to detail and lack of starter moves.

A common feature of Springbok play is stationary pods behind the advantage line or charging forwards receiving the ball too far behind the advantage line and, with players charging in too slowly. It was rare for the Springboks to recycle the ball more than 5 times in a row because of just this problem.

The Springboks were also far too one dimensional in taking the ball up. It was always Schalk Burger or Jannie du Plessis charging into channels 1 or 2.

What about using the backline, taking it wide and running some angles like Samoa did…. or the No9 looping around before sending it wide like NZ did when Slade scored that fantastic try against the Springboks in the Tri-Nations?

• Not attacking space 

One of the biggest problems with South African rugby is the obsession with running over the opponent rather than attacking space. We saw this in abundance against Australia in the quarters. “Schalk the Hulk” was crashing into opponents to the extent that it became boringly predictable.

This has to be addressed and hopefully the new coach will have a strategy to constantly increase the percentage of time in which players attack space. Crashing it up is ok on the odd occasion, but certainly not every time and variety and surprise is going to win the Springboks future matches, not brute force.

Lastly was that pass forward? Check this out: